Illinois Pitfalls In Preserving Dying Party’s Testimony

A recent case from the Fifth District of Illinois' intermediate appellate court illustrates how very different the Illinois state rules are from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure concerning deposition discovery. Berry v. American Standard, Inc., No. 5-06-0621, 2008 Ill. App. LEXIS 475 (Ill. App. (5th Dist.) May 19, 2008), also discusses an important pitfall when attempting to preserve the testimony of a dying party.

In Berry, plaintiff sued multiple defendants for asbestos-related injuries after learning that he had contracted terminal mesothelioma and had a life expectancy of less than 18 months. Plaintiff quickly served defendants with a notice that his deposition would take place on February 25, 2004. The notice stated that the deposition would be an "evidence deposition."

Under Illinois procedure, a deposition may either be a "discovery deposition" or an "evidence deposition." Except under limited circumstances, the only deposition that may be used in court in lieu of in-person testimony is an evidence deposition. The court in Berry explained the distinction as follows (citations omitted):

Illinois has long recognized a sharp distinction between depositions taken for the purpose of discovery and those taken for use as evidence at a trial. The purpose of a discovery deposition is to explore the facts of the case, and for this reason wide latitude is given in the scope and manner of questioning. Discovery depositions are used to obtain information, to commit witnesses to particular stories, and to obtain admissions from opposing parties. Their admissibility in evidence is limited. Knowing in advance that a deposition is for discovery only and hence of limited availability, counsel ordinarily do not urge technical objections, and the taking of the deposition proceeds informally and expeditiously. Discovery depositions are not permitted to be used at a trial even if the deponent is unavailable, because that use would inhibit free discovery by requiring time-consuming evidentiary objections at every discovery deposition. In contrast, an evidence deposition is generally used for the purpose of preserving testimony for trial, and questioning is therefore limited by the rules of evidence.

Plaintiff knew that it was important to preserve his testimony through an evidence deposition, not merely a discovery deposition, because he was not going to live long enough to testify in person. That is why he noticed his own evidence deposition.

Because an evidence deposition serves as the equivalent of trial testimony, opposing parties typically first take a discovery deposition of the witness – no one wants to examine a witness for the first time at trial, after all. The Berry defendants exercised their right to object to being forced to take an evidence deposition without the benefit of a prior discovery deposition. Ultimately, the trial court agreed and plaintiff's deposition proceeded as a discovery deposition instead, with the parties agreeing to take the evidence deposition once the discovery deposition was completed.

Unfortunately, the discovery deposition became a long, drawn-out affair due to the large number of defendants seeking to examine plaintiff and extensive related motion practice. Plaintiff passed away before his evidence deposition could be taken, and plaintiff's wife was substituted as executrix.

Defendants subsequently moved to bar plaintiff from using any of the discovery deposition as testimony at trial, citing Illinois Supreme Court Rule 212(a)(5). The trial court agreed and the appellate court affirmed. When it comes to using discovery depositions as evidence, the Illinois rules are even more strict if the testimony at issue is of a party. The few situations listed in Rule 212(a)(5) permitting discovery depositions to be used at trial do not apply if the witness is a party or a controlled expert witness:

(a) *** Discovery depositions taken under the provisions of this rule may be used only: *** (5) upon reasonable notice to all parties, as evidence at trial or hearing against a party who appeared at the deposition or was given proper notice thereof, if the court finds that the deponent is neither a controlled expert witness nor a party, the deponent's evidence deposition has not been taken, and the deponent is unable to attend or testify because of death or infirmity, and if the court, based on its sound discretion, further finds such evidence at trial or hearing will do substantial justice between or among the parties.

Plaintiff advanced numerous arguments why his discovery deposition should be permitted at trial, but the court refused to bend the rules. Most significant was the argument that because of his death he was no longer a "party" for purposes of the rule, which was a matter of first impression in Illinois. The court rejected that argument, holding that his wife's substitution kept him in the case as a party for all purposes. (After all, if that were not true the case would have to be dismissed for lack of a plaintiff.)

This harsh result stands in sharp contrast to federal civil procedure. First of all, there is no distinction between "discovery" and "evidence" depositions. Second, the rules are more relaxed when it comes to using a deposition as trial testimony. If this case had been brought in federal court, Mr. Berry could have testified by deposition under Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(4): "A party may use for any purpose the deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, if the court finds: (A) that the witness is dead." It's that simple.

So what should you do when you need to preserve a dying party's testimony for use at trial in Illinois? It is critical that you take that party's evidence deposition; the courts will accept no substitutes. If time is short, make your notice of deposition a notice of both a discovery and an evidence deposition. In some of the cases that the Fifth District distinguished, the deposition had been noticed that way, and the courts allowed use of the transcript where the other side had not objected at the deposition to its being an evidence deposition. If the other side does object, try to conduct any motion practice as expeditiously as possible, perhaps on an emergency basis.

Change Is Good

I have not been able to attend to this blog as much as I wanted to for the last two months because I've been busy starting a new law firm.

At the end of last year I left Jenner & Block and undertook the process of launching Lynch & Stern, LLP. I'm very pleased to be working with Dan Lynch, a colleague of mine for many years who left Jenner in 2002. It is very exciting to start something new like this, and to make such a major change as leaving BigLaw. I'm enjoying all the work of forming the new company and taking care of the hundreds of details involving in laying the foundation.

One of those tasks was to create a website. I did not want to purchase any of the ready-made sites or use the common designers that many small firms and solos seem to be using these days. They all have a certain sameness to them. Instead, I learned how to create a modern website built with CSS, and put that knowledge together with my photography skills to create an original site at http://www.lynchandstern.com/. Check it out!

Now I will continue to blog here about new cases and other legal developments in litigation procedure, electronic evidence, and other items of interest.

While House Embroiled In E-Discovery Controversy

While lawyers may be getting used to the occasional e-discovery dispute boiling over into the trade press or advance sheets, we still don't expect to see it make front-page news in traditional media. But there, on the front of today's Chicago Tribune, Wall Street Journal, and many others, are dreaded phrases like "deleted e-mails," "backup tapes," and "preservation."

The White House has been under fire since last year based on an investigation that found numerous e-mails had not been preserved as they should have been. White House Press Secretary Dana Perino acknowledged this in April 2007, saying there could be as much as 5 million missing e-mails. In response to that report, a public watchdog group called Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington, brought a lawsuit asserting that the White House and certain agencies were in violation of the Federal Records Act and other statutes. Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. Executive Office of the President, Civ. No. 1:07 cv 1707 (HHK) (D.D.C.).

The complaint asserted that the only place the missing e-mails might still exist is on backup tapes the White House made for disaster recovery purposes. Plaintiff moved for expedited discovery on that subject. In response, on January 8, 2008 the court ordered the government to provide an affidavit answering four specific questions designed to cut through the dispute and determine whether the backup tapes did or did not have the e-mails that were the subject of the case.

Yesterday, the White House filed the affidavit. It essentially admitted that the White House "recycled" its backup tapes for several years. In other words, many of the e-mails are not going to be found on those tapes because tapes regularly were overwritten with newer data. If this sounds like the kind of thing that gets litigants into trouble these days, you're right. In its briefs, the White House seems to take the position that because the recycling did not happen once the complaint was filed, but that misses the point. The lawsuit maintains that the government has a statutory duty not to destroy the e-mails wholly apart from whatever obligations exist under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Even without that duty, the duty to preserve would have kicked in much earlier because of plaintiff's pre-litigation demands.

This has the potential to become the best-known e-discovery spoliation case to date. Watch the plaintiff's web site as the story develops.

U.S. Supreme Court To Address Whether Prevailing Party Wins Paralegal Fees At Billed Market Rate Rather Than At Cost

The U.S. Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Richlin Security Service Co. v. Chertoff, No. 06-1717 (cert. granted Nov. 13, 2007).

Plaintiff successfully pursued a claim in the Department of Transportation Board of Contract Appeals, and received an award as prevailing party under the Equal Access to Justice Act. However, the Board considered paralegal fees to be counsel’s expenses, reimbursable at cost rather than at the market rates at which the attorney billed his or her clients. The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that “EAJA only permits reimbursement for paralegal services at cost.” Richlin Security Service Co. v. Chertoff, 472 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

The dissent argued that the majority’s holding was at odds with established Supreme Court and Federal Circuit precedent. In addition, the certiorari petition argued that the holding below contradicted the law of four other circuits.

Court Sanctions Party For Over-Designating Documents As Confidential

Parties often stipulate to protective orders under which a producing party is given the right to designate appropriate documents to be treated as "confidential." However, as the court held in Del Campo v. American Corrective Counseling Services, Inc., No. C-01-21151 JW (PVT) (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2007), the designating party must bear the responsibility for determining which documents truly are appropriate for confidential treatment.

The particular order at issue in Del Campo included a specific provision requiring each designating party to “take care to limit any such designations to specific material that qualifies under the appropriate standards,” and noted that indiscriminate designations “expose the Designating Party to possible sanctions.” The court found that the defendants produced thousands of documents with a blanket confidentiality designation in violation of the order, including obviously public documents such as law review articles and Web pages, and then failed to support their designations when challenged. The court ordered defendants to pay plaintiff’s attorney’s fees for challenging the over-designation.

The protective order here made the court's job a little easier because the court needed to look no further than the wording of the order to find violations. It seems likely, however, that even if a protective order lacked an express term concerning over-designation, a court easily could find violation of a protective order that merely permitted designation as "confidential" if the documents challenged clearly were not appropriate for confidential treatment.

Filing Voluntary Dismissal Starts Clock For One-Year Refiling Rule Immediately

The Seventh Circuit has issued an opinion that once again illustrates the dangers of waiting until the last moment under a statute of limitations.

In Jenkins v. Village of Maywood, No. 06-3411, 2007 WL 3239198 (7th Cir. Nov. 5, 2007), plaintiff filed a joint stipulation for voluntary dismissal of his Section 1983 action in federal court pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(ii) on March 9, 2004. The court prepared an order of dismissal on the same day, and the clerk entered it on the docket on March 15, 2004.

One year later, on March 15, 2005, plaintiff essentially re-filed the case in federal court. The statute of limitations for Section 1983 actions is derived from the appropriate state statute and its corresponding tolling rules. In this case, Illinois law applied and plaintiff's new case would have been out of time but for the existence of a special tolling statute. Under 735 ILCS 5/13-217, a plaintiff who voluntarily dismisses a case may commence the action again within one year or within the remaining limitations period, whichever is greater. Plaintiff believed that his filing within one year of the dismissal was timely because the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure specifies that a voluntary dismissal is not effective for purposes of the one-year tolling rule until the clerk has entered the order onto the docket.

The Seventh Circuit disagreed, holding that the date that plaintiff filed the stipulation controlled instead. That is because federal, not state, procedural law governs a federal case even if the applicable statute of limitations is derived from state law. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a), no order is needed to effect a voluntary dismissal. It specifically states that "an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court ... by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action." Thus, the dismissal became effective as a matter of applicable law when plaintiff filed the stipulation on March 9, 2004, not when the clerk entered it on the docket the following week.

The moral of the story: Don't file a complaint on what you think is the last possible day. Courts might find that you did not count correctly, or that the "mailbox rule" or other tolling rule did not work the way you thought it did, and you will have left no margin for error.

Florida High Court Again Leaves Emotional Distress “Impact Rule” In Place

In Willis v. Gami Golden Glades, LLC, No. SC04-1929, 2007 WL 3024039 (Fla. Oct. 18, 2007), the intermediate appellate court certified questions to the Florida Supreme Court that invited reconsideration of the state’s “impact rule.” Under that rule, Florida treats emotional distress claims differently depending on whether the plaintiff has suffered a physical impact from an external force.

If there was an impact, Florida permits recovery for emotional distress not only from the impact itself but also for distress stemming from the incident during which the impact occurred. Without an impact, a plaintiff can only recover for mental distress manifested by the physical injury and the plaintiff must have been directly involved in the traumatizing event.

Although the certified questions raised important questions about the application of the impact rule, and invited reconsideration of the rule itself, the majority in Willis concluded that the facts of the case -- involving an assault and battery in a parking lot that plaintiff used at defendant’s direction -- so clearly satisfied the rule that none of the other issues argued by the parties needed to be addressed. However, the concurring and dissenting opinions addressed those issues and the underlying policy questions at length.

New York Does Not Recognize Tort Of Negligent Spoliation By Third Parties

In Ortega v. City of New York, No. 118, 2007 N.Y. Slip Op. 07741, 2007 WL 2988760 (N.Y. Oct. 16, 2007), New York’s highest court refused to recognize spoliation of evidence as an independent tort.

Plaintiff had suffered injuries in a vehicle that caught fire, but the City of New York negligently destroyed the vehicle in the ordinary course of its handling of unclaimed vehicles despite plaintiff’s attorney having obtained an order to preserve the car. Plaintiff did not attempt to sue the manufacturer, but sued the city on a theory of negligent spoliation.

The high court joined the majority of other courts considering the question, and ruled that no such cause of action exists. It also observed that here the plaintiff was not without some recourse given that she could pursue at least some damages for the city’s contempt of court.

Internet service providers, computer backup companies, on-line storage outfits and similar companies in New York perhaps heaved a collective sigh of relief, knowing that they could not be sued (at least in New York) for spoliation because of accidental or even intentional deletion of electronic files.

Plaintiff Has Right To Re-Present Evidence At Retrial Before New Judge

In Anderson v. Kohler, No. 2-05-1212, 2007 WL 2964372 (Ill. App. (2d Dist.) Oct. 4, 2007), plaintiffs sued for breach of contract but the court granted defendants’ motion at the close of plaintiffs’ evidence in a bench trial after finding, without making credibility determinations, that plaintiffs had not proven that the contract existed. The appellate court reversed and remanded for “further proceedings.”

However, the successor judge before whom the case was retried did not permit plaintiff to start again. Rather, he relied on the transcript of the first trial and only heard defendants’ case and plaintiffs’ rebuttal live, and then entered judgment for defendants after crediting their testimony over plaintiffs’.

On a second appeal, the appellate court ruled that the refusal to allow plaintiffs to present all evidence through live testimony violated their due process rights. The court held that absent agreement of the parties, a successor judge may not make credibility determinations based on a transcript of proceedings over which another judge presided, even if the new judge heard some live testimony from all the same witnesses.

The opinion did not discuss it, but a serious problem here is that a plaintiff who suffers a directed verdict has put on her entire case, while defendant has not reciprocated. Thus, defendant knows what plaintiff's case is, but plaintiff does not know defendant's case. If remanded for a new trial, a plaintiff must be given the chance to vary how she presented her case, so that the first half of the case is not entirely following a script that defendant has already read.

One might argue that the judge was just trying to save time on remand. But the system should not try to save time at the expense of a party.

State’s Agreement To Federal Venue Clause Waived Immunity Defense

The State of Massachusetts has learned that its agreement to a venue clause in a license agreement had the unintended consequence of waiving its defense of immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.

In Baum Research and Devel. Co. v. Univ. of Massachusetts at Lowell, No. 2006-1330, 2007 WL 2937300 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 10, 2007), a patent owner sued the state university for breach of a patent license agreement in Michigan federal court. The venue was chosen pursuant to a clause that stated “all parties agree to proper venue and hereby submit to jurisdiction in the appropriate State or Federal Courts of Record sitting in the State of Michigan.”

Defendant asserted Eleventh Amendment immunity, but the trial and appellate courts held that the venue clause waived that defense. While the state may have assumed it would be able to assert immunity and the clause simply established Michigan courts would hear that defense, the clause actually had the broader effect of waiving the defense altogether.

New York Savings Statute Does Not Apply To Substituted Plaintiff

New York, like many states, has a statute that allows a plaintiff whose case is dismissed other than voluntarily or upon a final judgment on the merits to re-file the case within a certain amount of time, presumably after correcting defects, which in effect extends the statute of limitations. Under CPLR § 205(a), New York allows such a plaintiff a grace period of an additional six months to re-file after the dismissal.

In Reliance Ins. Co. v. Polyvision Corp., No. 117, 2007 N.Y. Slip Op. 07500, 2007 WL 2947396 (N.Y. Oct. 11, 2007), answering a certified question from the Second Circuit, New York’s highest court held that § 205(a) does not apply if the plaintiff seeking to “re-file” is not the same plaintiff. The lower courts found the particular plaintiff who originally filed in Reliance Ins. Co. was not the correct entity, and a corporate affiliate un­suc­cessfully sought to re-file in reliance on § 205(a) to extend the statute of limitations.

Ninth Circuit Determines Removing Defendant’s Burden

In Guglielmino v. McKee Foods Corp., No. 05-16144, 2007 WL 2916193 (9th Cir. Oct. 9, 2007), the Ninth Circuit determined as a matter of first impression the burden that a removing defendant must meet to establish federal jurisdiction where plaintiff moves to remand but the complaint specifically alleges damages below the diversity amount.

Here, defendants removed a case in which the complaint alleged damages of “less than $75,000,” and plaintiff’s motion to remand under 28 U.S.C. § 1447 attached affidavits with similar disclaimers. The appellate court observed that its precedents have placed three different burdens on removing defendants, depending on the circumstances. First, when the complaint alleges an amount on its face suffucuent to meet the jurisdictional threshold, the Ninth Circuit presumes that federal jurisdiction is satisfied "unless it appears to a 'legal certainty' that the plaintiff cannot actually recover that amount." (That could be called the "we take the plaintiff at his word unless it is undeniably only wishful thinking" rule.) Second, when the complaint is unclear or ambiguous about the jurisdictional amount, the removing defendant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the jurisdictional amount is met. Finally, when a complaint specifically alleges an amount in controversy that is less than the jurisdictional threshold, the party seeking removal must prove with legal certainty that the jurisdictional amount is met.

The new wrinkle here is that the complaint did not allege an amount but also pled that, whatever the damages were, they were less than $75,000. The Ninth Circuit concluded that this situation fit the second category of complaints best because the controlling factor was the ambiguity of the allegations. Thus, where a plaintiff specifically alleges damages are below the jurisdictional amount for diversity, but does not allege an actual total amount in controversy, the defendant must support removal by a “preponderance of the evidence.”

I have wondered about why, in a situation in which plaintiff is the movant -- having filed a motion to remand -- the court expresses its view in terms of the burden the non-movant defendant faces. Usually the movant bears the burden on his own motion. Why shouldn't the plaintiff have the burden of demonstrating the lack of federal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence, rather than the defendant having the burden to establish the existence of federal jurisdiction? Perhaps the answer is that federal jurisdiction is never assumed and always must be established to the court's satisfaction. It follows that whoever is the proponent of the federal forum has to bear the burden of estabilshing entitlement to that forum, and in this case it is the removing defendant. That principle apparently trumps the ordinary rule that a movant bears his own burden.

Judge O'Scannlain filed a concurrence in Guglielmino examining the issue of defendants' and plaintiffs' competing burdens that the majority glossed over. He disagreed with the majority's imposition of a "legal certainty" burden on the removing defendant, a party seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction, rather than the moving plaintiff, a party seeking to defeat federal jurisdiction. He concluded that "in all cases where removal to federal court is challeneged in any appropriate way, it is incumbent upon the party seeking federal jurisdiction to prove the facts giving rise to such jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Only then, and only by proof to a legal certainty, can a party defeat the exercise of federal jurisdiction which those established fact support." He quoted approvingly from Judge Frank Easterbrook's opinion in Meridian Security Ins. Co. v. Sadowski, 441 F.3d 536 (7th Cir. 2006), which he says attempted to organize and clarify that court's removal law into a coherent whole. He observed that his proposal was consistent with the views of the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits, and would resolve the multiple approaches of his own court into a single standard.

Illinois Courts Lacked Jurisdiction To Hear Federal Civil Rights Claims

The intermediate appellate court of Illinois has reversed a judgment upon a jury trial because the trial court lacked jurisdiction.

In Blount v. Stroud, No. 1-06-2428, 2007 WL 2820964 (Ill. App. (1st Dist.) Sept. 28, 2007), the plaintiff sued her former employer for common law retaliatory discharge and for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, ultimately receiving a favorable jury verdict of over $3 million in largely punitive damages.

However, the appellate court held that the Illinois Human Rights Act provided that the Illinois Human Rights Commission was the exclusive venue for hearing civil rights claims in Illinois in the first instance, and that trial courts were authorized only to hear such matters on administrative review.

Intersting footnote: The court noted that the Act has been amended so that beginning in 2008 plaintiffs may bring civil rights claims before either the Commission or the trial courts. Thus, the problem in Blount is not likely to be repeated in the future.

Firm’s “Continuous Representation” Tolling Ceases When Attorney And Client Leave

I recently discussed New York’s “continuous representation doctrine” under which the limitations period for legal malpractice actions is tolled during the period that the client was represented by defendant counsel. (“New York Declines To Extend ‘Continuous Representation Doctrine’ To Auditor,” posted here). The Supreme Court of California, which had adopted the doctrine, recently examined a variation on the traditional fact pattern.

In Beal Bank, SSB v. Arter & Hadden, LLP, 42 Cal.4th 503, 167 P.3d 666, 66 Cal.Rptr.3d 52 (Cal. Sept. 27, 2007), an attorney rendered legal services to plaintiff while employed by a particular firm. The attorney then left and the client followed him, continuing to engage him for further services in the same matter. Later, the client sued the attorney for malpractice and also named the former firm as a defendant. The original firm argued that once the client followed the attorney to his new firm the statute of limitations resumed running, and had expired by the time the plaintiff filed its lawsuit.

Resolving a split in the intermediate appellate courts, the California Supreme Court held that tolling under the continuous representation doctrine ceases with respect to the original firm when the attorney leaves and the client follows him. Noting that the doctrine is a judicially-created exception to the statute of limitations for legal malpractice actions expressly adopted by the state in reaction to high court precedent, the court refused to assume legislative intent to broaden that exception in the absence of clear textual support.

No Cause Of Action Exists For “Genericide” Or Disparagement Of A Trademark

The Ninth Circuit has rejected a plaintiff’s attempt to sue a defendant who publicly pressed his opinion that the term “freecycle” should be in the public domain.

In Freecycle Network, Inc. v. Oey, No. 06-16219, 2007 WL 2781902 (9th Cir. Sept. 26, 2007), plaintiff brought claims purportedly under the Lanham Act to enjoin defendant from proclaiming that plaintiff had no right to assert that “freecycle” is a trademark, which it termed “trademark disparagement.” Plaintiff also sought to stop defendant from trying to use the term as part of the English language so as to make it a generic term incapable of being registered as a trademark, which it called “genericide.”

The Ninth Circuit refused to recognize that the Lanham Act or common law provided such causes of action. The statute permitted claims for disparagement of a product itself, not the trademark for the product. The court also noted that the means for trademark owners to avoid letting a mark become generic is by using publicity campaigns to encourage the public not to use a mark in common parlance, rather than by suing people who allegedly misuse it.

Admiralty Defendant Still May Demand Jury Based On Counterclaims

A plaintiff bringing a case that satisfies the requirements for both admiralty and diversity jurisdiction can elect to proceed on either basis, the primary difference being that a jury generally is not available if plaintiff files a libel in admiralty rather than an ordinary civil complaint. See In re: Chimenti, 79 F.3d 534, 537 (6th Cir. 1996). A plaintiff might want to exclude a jury for strategic reasons, and therefore could elect the admiralty route.

However, In re: Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 06-1344, 2007 WL 2793112 (4th Cir. Sept. 27, 2007), illustrates that a defendant can frustrate that election by bringing a declaratory judgment counterclaim and filing a jury demand. In Lockheed Martin, plaintiff successfully moved to strike defen­dant’s jury demand, arguing that the declaratory judgment claim was merely the “flipside” of plaintiff’s affirmative claims, and that defendant should not be permitted an end-run around plaintiff’s admiralty strategy. Defendant filed a mandamus petition.

Noting a split in the circuits, the appellate court held that 28 U.S.C. § 1333 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(h) permitted a defendant to bring proper non-admiralty counterclaims and to have them tried to a jury. The court granted the writ of mandamus.

Plaintiff's Own Withdrawal Of Federal Claim Ends Jurisdiction Over State Claim

In addition to claims that fall within specific federal subject-matter jurisdiction, federal courts also are permitted to hear state-law claims pled as part of the same case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction).

It is well-established that if a defendant successfully moves to dismiss all of the claims for which federal jurisdiction exists, leaving only claims based on state law, the district court has the discretion to dismiss the state-law claims (which the plaintiff then might be able to assert in state court). District courts frequently do just that. See, e.g., Sanchez & Daniels v. Koresko, No. 07-1228, 2007 WL 2757761 (7th Cir. Sept. 24, 2007) (district court properly terminated case after dismissing all claims over which it had original jurisdiction).

The Eleventh Circuit recently considered a case in which the termination of all federal claims occurred by plaintiff’s voluntary amendment of the complaint. In contrast to the discretionary standard applicable after granting of a Rule 12 motion, in Pintando v Miami-Dade Housing Agency, 501 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. Sept. 25, 2007), the court found that when a party voluntarily withdraws all claims over which the district court had original jurisdiction, the judge is required to dismiss the case. Analogizing to Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. Unites States, 127 S. Ct. 1397 (2007) [covered in a previous post], the court held that the withdrawal of allegations in an amended complaint which had formed the basis of federal jurisdiction defeats jurisdiction altogether, and the case cannot continue in federal court.

Thus, if confronted with a situation like this one, a district court may grant a motion for leave to amend, and then must immediately dismiss the case for lack of federal jurisdiction.

Second Circuit Now Requires Parties Jointly To Affirmatively Request Oral Argument

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has adopted an interim rule, effective August 27, 2007, that imposes a new, ‘opt-in’ procedure for oral argument. It does not appear that any other circuit has adopted such a requirement.

Under Fed.R.Civ.App. 34, oral argument is required unless the court finds that certain conditions are satisfied such that oral argument can be dispensed with and the case decided solely on the briefs. The Rule also specifies that a court “may require by local rule a statement explaining why oral argument should, or need not, be permitted.”

In a new twist on that rule, the Second Circuit’s Interim Local Rule 34 requires the parties to file a joint statement indicating whether they seek oral argument or agree to submit the case on the briefs. If the parties disagree, that must also be indicated. The joint statement is due within 14 days after the due date for the last brief. Any party failing to file the statement will be deemed not to seek oral argument.

The court allowed a one-month comment period, which expires September 27, 2007, and is running simultaneously with the adoption of the rule itself. There does not seem to have been much publicity about this, and because it is a unique and counter-intuitive change (going from an opt-out system to an opt-in system), the new rule seems like a trap for the unwary.

“Original Source” Rule Disqualifying Some Claims Does Not Bar Remaining Claims

I recently reported on the U.S. Supreme Court’s consideration of the jurisdictional nature of the “original source” rule in the False Claims Act. See Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 1397 (2007), discussed here. The Tenth Circuit recently faced a similar issue.

In United States ex rel. Boother v. Sun Healthcare Group, Inc., 496 F.3d 1169 (10th Cir. Aug. 7, 2007), the Tenth Circuit considered whether a relator bringing a qui tam action alleging several counts could proceed even if some of the counts lacked jurisdiction due to the “original source” rule. The court held as a matter of first impression that a deficiency in one claim does not preclude jurisdiction over all other claims joined in the same lawsuit.

The district court had dismissed the case after finding a jurisdictional defect in three claims. However, following the model of Rockwell Int’l Corp., the appellate court remanded the case for an independent jurisdictional analysis of each of the remaining claims.

Mandamus Granted Against Enforcement of Web-Only Amendments To Contract

The Ninth Circuit has addressed as a matter of first impression at the appellate level the question of whether a court should enforce amendments to a contract where the only notice of the changed terms consisted of the amending party posting the revised contract on its website. The court took the case on mandamus and granted the writ, effectively reversing the district court's decision to enforce.

In Douglas v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Central Dist. of California, 495 F.3d 1062 (July 18, 2007) (per curiam), plaintiff Douglas had contracted for long distance telephone service. Subsequently, the provider purported to amend the contract to add provisions unfavorable to Douglas, such as additional service charges, a choice-of-law provision applying New York law, a clause requiring disputes to be arbitrated and a waiver of class actions. The new contract was posted to the company's billing website but Douglas alleged that the company never informed its customers of the changes. Only someone who happened to check the posted contract and compared it to a prior one they had saved would have known of the amendments.

After becoming aware of the changes, Douglas filed a class action in federal court. The company moved to compel arbitration, pursuant to the arbitration clause whose addition to the contract was itself in dispute. The district court gave effect to the amendments and granted the motion. Douglas filed a petition for mandamus because he recognized that no ordinary appellate jurisdiction exists over orders compelling arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act.

Applying its five-factor test for mandamus petitions, the Ninth Circuit found that the prerequisites for issuance of the writ had been met. Most importantly, the district court's ruling was "clearly erroneous as a matter of law" because a party simply cannot amend a contract without its counter-party's agreement, and it is elemental that such agreement requires knowledge by the counter-party. The appellate court held:

"Parties to a contract have no obligation to check the terms on a periodic basis to learn whether they have been changed by the other side. FN: Nor would a party known when to check the website for possible changes to the contract terms without being notified that the contract has been changed and how. Douglas would have had to check the contract every day for possible changes. Without notice, an examination would be fairly cumbersome, as Douglas would have had to compare every word of the posted contract with his existing contract in order to detect whether it had changed."

The court distinguished other cases of web-based contractual updates because in each such case the poster had given some form of notice to the counter-party. Moreover, the court found that even if notice of the changes were properly given, the changes probably would not have been enforceable substantively.

The court also found that other mandamus factors were satisfied. Factors amphasizing the absence of remedy on appeal had been met becuase if Douglas were forced to arbitrate he would have had no means to ensure that he could continue as class representative. This case also satisfied the factor favoring mandamus where a district court order raises an issue of law of first impression or raises new and important problems. The Ninth Circuit viewed this case as raising for the first time an issue that would affect a multitude of situations arising from the common practice of communicating with customers through websites.